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Wolfgang Streeck and Sigurt Vitols
9.1 Introduction
Attempts to develop legal instruments for workforce participation at the Eu-
ropean Community level, either to harmonize national industrial relations sys-
tems or to extend participation regimes to multinational companies, go back
as far as the early 1970s. The period was one of union strength throughout
Europe in the wake of the 1968 and 1969 strike wave, and of ascendancy of
social democratic parties in EC member states, most notably in West Germany.
Industrial democracy at the workplace and in the enterprise had come to be
widely perceived as an indispensable condition for social consensus within a
union-inclusive bargained economy, with shared responsibility for full em-
ployment at acceptable rates of inflation. Also, expectations for the future of
the European Community were generally optimistic, based on a widespread
belief in growing market integration more or less inevitably requiring and
bringing about political and institutional integration.
One consequence of the rise of social democracy in an increasingly interna-
tional Europe was the agreement among the EC heads of state and govern-
ments at their first summit in October 1972 to endow the European Community
with the beginnings of a welfare-state-like social policy. Prominent among the
objectives of the so-called Social Action Programme were Europe-wide infor-
mation, consultation, and co-determination rights for workers at the work-
place. In subsequent years the Programme slowly worked its way through the
EC legislative machinery, with little success, and even less as time passed. With
the change in political climate at the end of the decade, EC social policy was
effectively abandoned as European integration ground to a halt. Indeed, it had
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contributed heavily to this event in that it had created strong hostility among
business against the European Community, most of all for its attempt to impose
legally binding obligations on Europe's powerful multinational corporations to
inform and consult with their workforces across national borders.
When in the mid-1980s the Single European Act and the Internal Market
project relaunched the integration process, the European Commission tried to
attach to it a new, less ambitious version of the Social Action Programme,
referred to in EC jargon as the "Social Dimension of the Internal Market." Very
little of this, if any, has yet found its way into EC legislation (Streeck 1995).
Mandatory workplace representation was again proposed, and again not
achieved. With the Maastricht Treaty and its aftermath, the European Commu-
nity seems less likely than ever to acquire a meaningful capacity for legislation
on social matters.
The difficulties for EC action on worker participation are many. To begin
with, European employers have always been firmly opposed to any EC social
policy that went beyond the proclamation of nonbinding general principles.
European legislation on workplace representation in particular was and is un-
conditionally rejected. It is important to note that this position is shared even
by employers, such as the German ones, who in their own countries have long
successfully operated under legally instituted participation regimes.
Publicly, European employers never objected to participation per se. As
early as the 1970s, European business associations argued that worker partici-
pation was part and parcel of good management and was already being widely
practiced on a voluntary basis. Rather than imposing it by legislation, the Euro-
pean Community was urged to let participation grow on its own, arranged
spontaneously and voluntarily at the local level between managements and
their workforces in line with the specific and diverse business conditions and
organizational traditions of individual workplaces. This insistence on volunta-
rism has remained nonnegotiable up to the present: having no interest in EC
social policy other than in preventing it, European employers never had to con-
sider accepting formal participation rights in exchange for union or EC conces-
sions on demands of their own.
European unions, in turn, have a history of unsuccessful attempts to bargain
with multinational companies through international company committees and
sectoral union federations (Levinson 1972; Northrup and Rowan 1979; Grahl
and Teague 1991). In the early 1970s, they had come to regard EC legislation
on worker participation as welcome and, indeed, indispensable assistance for
their international organizing activities, in that it promised to force multina-
tional companies to enter into at least some kind of industrial relations at the
European level. Getting such legislation enacted was, however, a different mat-
ter. EC political institutions are structured in such a way that interests in affir-
mative supranational government lack suitable points of access to its decision-
making machinery. For example, EC legislation is passed, not by an elected
parliament, but by the Council of Ministers in which each member state has
one vote and which on important issues decides only by unanimous vote.245 Europe: Between Mandatory Consultation and Voluntary Information
Producing what is in effect domestic legislation through international diplo-
macy and intergovernmental negotiations is awkward, not only because nor-
mally one member government is enough to prevent proposals being enacted.
In addition, partly reflecting the European Community's lack of a responsive
political system and partly prolonging it, unions suffer from endemically weak
organization at the European level, their organizational base having always
been and remaining the various national industrial relations systems. It is true
that, to some extent, the same conditions affect organized business. The differ-
ence is, however, that while labor has a positive interest in European social
policy, business has only a negative one. As a consequence, institutional weak-
ness and deadlock at the EC level, while a liability for labor, is an asset for
business. Where the institutional cards are stacked toward nondecisions, inter-
ests that require decisions are likely to suffer defeat regardless of effort, while
interests served by nondecisions can often expect to prevail even though or
precisely because they are unwilling or unable to play.
National governments, for their part, came to find European-level workforce
participation more and more intractable. Initially, in the years after the strike
wave, there seems to have been wide tacit acceptance of a need to harmonize
national participation arrangements along the lines of the "German model,"
which was generally regarded as the most advanced way of achieving labor
peace. Subsequently, however, more traditional concerns again became domi-
nant, in particular the preservation of the sovereignty of member states and the
integrity of national industrial relations systems, including the role of national
governments in mediating the balance of power between capital and labor. Har-
monization of national systems through a transfer of legislative authority to the
Community thus lost its political appeal.
This left the possibility of supranational legislation applying only to multi-
national companies. Just as by EC-wide harmonization, the integrity of na-
tional industrial relations systems may also be impaired by large firms using
their multinational organization to evade national obligations, not least work-
force information and consultation requirements. Provided it can be confined
to transnational actors that have grown beyond the reach of national systems
and threaten to upset the balance of these systems from the outside, suprana-
tional regulation, rather than undermining national control, may in fact help
restore it, making supranationalism potentially acceptable even and precisely
to sovereignty-conscious nation-states.
Increasingly, however, national governments also responded to the decline
since the late 1970s of union power and worker militancy and to growing busi-
ness pressures for restoration of managerial prerogative. The election of a Con-
servative government in Britain in 1979 provided business interests and their
political allies throughout Europe with energetic leadership and vastly reduced
the prospects of legislative initiatives on worker participation at the EC level.
Also, the emerging new domestic agendas in member states after the end of
the social democratic decade found the Community's lack of a supranational
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the nation-state to increase that of managements and "market forces," Euro-
pean governments began to perceive the absence of supranational regulation
not as a threat to the stability of national regulation but as helpful for the
achievement of national objectives of deregulation—including more "flexibil-
ity," "decentralization," and an expanded space for "voluntary" instead of man-
dated cooperation between capital and labor.
A prominent topic in the European debates of the 1980s and 1990s on
worker participation was the diversity of national industrial relations systems
within the European Community. British accession to membership in 1976
vastly added to that diversity, but other factors worked in the same direction
(Streeck 1992). Short of harmonization of national systems—which itself
must become more difficult as national differences increase—growing diver-
sity magnifies the technical problems of designing supranational regimes for
transnational actors that fit equally well with all constituent national systems
without causing unanticipated changes in them. For example, while mandatory
European works councils for multinational companies with rights to co-
determination would fit the German system, they may not sit equally well with
existing Italian institutions. Not only would they favor German over Italian
worker representatives serving on the same multinational works councils, but
they would also strengthen forces in Italy, among employers or unions, that
would like to move the Italian system closer to the German system. Especially
if motivated by a desire to restore the integrity of national regimes, Europe-
wide participation statutes for multinational companies must be drafted so as
to be simultaneously meaningful for workforces and neutral with respect to the
national systems in which companies operate—a task the Commission found
increasingly vexing.
As the 1970s passed, the preservation of the diversity of national industrial
relations systems slowly achieved the status of a normative objective in its
own right. This extended well into the ranks of supporters of EC social policy
legislation, qualifying and complicating their position and limiting their mobi-
lizing capacity at critical moments. National diversity was first invoked as a
value by the Left as European unions became uneasy about the emerging he-
gemony of the "German model," both in draft EC legislation and in the internal
politics of European union confederations. The relative success at home of the
German system in the difficult 1980s, especially from a union perspective, did
little to defuse the resistance, which presented itself as deeply committed to
nationally distinctive ideas of solidarity and union democracy; to different con-
cepts of the political and economic responsibilities of unions, the role of em-
ployers, and the proper relationship between capital and labor; and to alterna-
tive views of the state and of the need for unions to remain independent from
it. While the ideological debates about such issues as these have receded in
recent years, the tendency of European unions to defend their national institu-
tions against supranational interference, including institutions that would seem
to have worked comparatively less well for them, appears as strong today as
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Institutional nationalism among nationally organized unions is not necessar-
ily irrational, even in an increasingly international economy. Opportunities for
political influence at the EC level are untested and weak at best, and developing
them requires time and risky investment of scarce political and organizational
capital. By comparison, European unions are well established in their respec-
tive national welfare states, which they have helped build and together with
which they have grown. Externally caused institutional change in national sys-
tems is bound to upset the standard operating procedures and vested interests
of large numbers of organizations and officials. Reluctance to take this lightly
does not preclude recognition of the need for a supranational response to eco-
nomic externalities that threaten the integrity of national systems as much as,
and in the long term more than, institutional externalities. Organizing such a
response, however, raises severe collective action problems that are exacer-
bated by inevitable uncertainty about the costs and benefits of supranational-
ism for national actors, with respect to both the domestic power balance and
the distribution of influence in the new supranational institutions. The result is
unstable, oscillating preferences and weak commitments, with unity among
national union movements at the European level inversely related to the proba-
bility of proposals being passed into law.
The internal inconsistencies in the position of European unions on work-
place participation did not escape the attention of the employers, who were
often able to show that legislative initiatives had only shallow union support.
Early on, European employers, with the full cooperation of their German col-
leagues, joined European unions in the struggle against the German model
identified with any strongly normative European-level legislation on work-
place representation. Later employers pledged themselves, just as to volunta-
rism, decentralization, and local democracy, to Europe-wide preservation of
institutional and cultural diversity—in the act championing previously de-
plored practices like workplace bargaining, state abstention from industrial re-
lations, and multiunionism as "historically grown" elements of "national cul-
ture" worth preserving for their own sake, and offering unions coalitions at the
national level to defend national institutions against supranational meddling.
It is remarkable that such cultural conservationism went together with another,
quite different justification for opposition to supranational regulation: that
"market forces" should be left free to weed out the less economically competi-
tive national regimes and bring about Europe-wide convergence to market-
driven "best practice."
During the 1980s domestic policy making in the Community came under
the control of an ever more self-confident coalition between nationalism and
neoliberalism. For a time, the alliance between the two was personified by
Margaret Thatcher and her vigorous simultaneous defense of British national
sovereignty against "French multinational bureaucrats," and of the "free mar-
ket" against "socialism" creeping in through the Brussels back door. But in
fact this was far more than a personal or national idiosyncrasy. In the constella-
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gration process, and in the interaction between national politics, international
relations, and economic interests inside the developing EC polity, defending a
country's sovereignty in the councils of Europe and defending the freedom of
"market forces" in the integrated European economy had come to be one and
the same thing—inextricably intertwining the objectives of liberal nonregula-
tion of the integrated economy and of nationalist defense of state sovereignty,
and allowing opponents of an interventionist EC social policy freely and op-
portunistically to switch from a nationalist to a neoliberal frame of reference
and back, in support of identical substantive demands.
With the failure of the Maastricht Treaty to unseat the dominant EC coali-
tion, the second defeat of Europe-wide legislation on workplace participation
seems a foregone conclusion. The next section of this paper traces the various
attempts of the Community to create mandatory workplace rights for workers
and discusses their present status. The paper then looks at the proliferation of
voluntarily instituted European works councils in some multinational firms in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, at the time when the battle over the "social
dimension" was under way. While voluntary councils are sometimes regarded
as intermediate steps toward mandatory councils in EC law, it is argued here
that what one sees in Europe today may in fact be what one gets: an uneven
pattern of weak and unilaterally withdrawable company-specific participation
regimes growing in the empty spaces between competing national and supra-
national jurisdictions.
9.2 EC Legislation on Workforce Participation in European Firms
Beginning in the early 1970s, the Commission of the European Community
took a number of legislative initiatives on legal participation rights for workers
in European firms. Emerging from different policy contexts and based on a
variety of articles of the Treaty of Rome—the de facto EC constitution—none
of these were successful. Works councils or similar arrangements figured in
some proposals but not in all.
Workforce participation became a concern for the European Community in
three contexts: (1) the "harmonization" of national systems of company law,
(2) the development of supranational, "European" company law, and (3) the
creation of legal rights for workers vis-a-vis management to information and
consultation.
1
1. In the 1970s the European Community regarded differences in national
systems of company law as "restrictive conditions on the freedom of establish-
ment within the Community" (article 54 of the Treaty of Rome), deriving from
this a mandate to pursue "approximation and harmonization" of such systems.
The classical EC instrument for harmonization is a "directive," which once
1. The following draws in particular on various editions of the European Industrial Relations
Report (EIRR), especially no. 207 (April 1991): 23-27; Addison and Siebert (1991); Hall (1992).249 Europe: Between Mandatory Consultation and Voluntary Information
enacted obliges member countries to rewrite their laws in accordance with it.
In pursuit of harmonization, the Commission drafted a number of directives on
company law, one of which—the famous "Fifth Directive"—deals with the
governance structure of public limited-liability companies. The original draft
was issued in 1972. Inspired by the then Social-Liberal German government,
which was preparing legislation to strengthen company-level co-determination
in Germany, the draft proposed to prescribe a two-tier board system with an
obligatory supervisory board that would include employee representatives.
The 1972 draft directive never got close to enactment. In 1983 the Commis-
sion presented a revised version, which raised the minimum size for companies
falling under the statute from 500 to 1,000 employees. More important, it of-
fered firms and national legislators a choice among four alternative models of
workforce participation in company governance: (1) the two-tier board system
of the first draft, with one-third or one-half of supervisory board members
coming from among the workforce, (2) a single board with employee represen-
tatives as nonexecutive members, (3) a company-level representative body of
employees only (something akin to a works council without, however, being
so called), and (4) any other participation structure provided it was collectively
agreed upon between employer and workforce. The draft tried to ensure that
access to information and rights to consultation and co-determination were the
same regardless of what model was selected.
2. In addition to harmonizing national company law, the Commission also
proposed to create a European Company Statute. Firms would be given the
option to incorporate under that statute, as an alternative to incorporation in
national company law. A firm incorporated as a "European company," or Socie-
tas Europea, would have the advantage of being ipso facto considered incorpo-
rated in all EC countries, making it unnecessary for it to seek incorporation in
different national legal systems. The first draft of the statute was presented
in 1975 and required European companies to have a supervisory board that
included employee representatives with full rights to information and co-
determination, as well as a European works council. This combination of
company- and workplace-level co-determination was the closest the European
Community came to a wholesale adoption of the German model.
Like the Fifth Directive, the European Company Statute got stuck in the
legislative process, and in 1989 a revised draft was presented. The major
change was that the draft dropped the German dualism of supervisory board
and works council representation and instead offered firms the same menu of
alternative arrangements as the 1983 revision of the Fifth Directive. Concern-
ing the rights of worker representatives, while the 1975 draft had emphasized
co-management and co-determination, especially via the supervisory board,
the 1989 version emphasized information and consultation, again moving
closer to the Fifth Directive in its revised form.
3. It was only relatively late that workforce participation came to be dealt
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tives on company law or, more precisely, in response to their lack of progress.
In 1980 the then commissioner for social affairs, Henk Vredeling, issued a
broadly written draft directive on information and consultation rights for work-
forces, which came to be known as the "Vredeling directive." The initiative
drew on article 100 of the Treaty of Rome, which requires "approximation"
and "harmonization" of legal provisions in member states "as directly affect
the establishment or functioning of the common market." Politically, it tried to
follow up on two directives that had recently been passed under the Social
Action Programme, the Collective Redundancies Directive of 1977 and the
Transfer of Undertakings Directive of 1979. Both provided for workforce in-
formation and consultation in connection with the specific events they ad-
dressed (Addison and Siebert 1991). The Vredeling directive can be seen as an
attempt to extend the information and consultation rights enacted for firms
undergoing economic restructuring to firms in all economic circumstances—
thereby bypassing the legislative deadlock on company law and bringing work-
force participation within the ambit of EC social policy proper.
The 1980 Vredeling draft was largely agnostic on structural matters. While
it specified in great detail a wide range of information on financial, economic,
and employment issues to which workforces were to be regularly entitled, and
in addition established legal consultation rights on any decision likely to have
"serious consequences" for employee interests, it followed the example of the
Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings directives by assigning
the exercise of the new rights to "existing employee representatives by law or
practice." Another defining feature of the draft was that it focused on compa-
nies with subsidiaries, and on the access of workforces in branch plants to
information held by management at headquarters—and perhaps strategically
withheld from local management. In fact, the draft's main thrust was to make
it impossible for local management to excuse itself from obligations to inform
and consult on the grounds of centralization of information and decision mak-
ing in the parent company or at company headquarters.
In trying to create legal obligations for firms relative to their workforces in
subsidiary plants, the draft directive simultaneously addressed three situations:
where both headquarters and subsidiary are located in the same EC country,
where the headquarters is based in a different EC country than the subsidiary,
and where it is located outside the European Community. While the first situa-
tion is relatively easily covered by national legislation (although the directive
would have constructed a "harmonizing" common floor for all national sys-
tems), the second suggests itself as a classic case for supranational regulation
of transnational relations and externalities, given that the law of the country
with the subsidiary is likely to find it difficult to govern the behavior of a head-
quarters located on foreign territory. The third situation also raises the question
of exterritoriality, but in the relation between the European Community and
third countries.251 Europe: Between Mandatory Consultation and Voluntary Information
The draft Vredeling directive met with unprecedented hostility from busi-
ness, European and extra-European (DeVos 1989). In part, this may have been
because of the high specificity of the information and consultation rights stipu-
lated by the draft. Nonetheless, it is hard to see how the substance of the direc-
tive justified the fierce battle that ensued. Very likely, that battle was more over
the Social Action Programme as a whole and over the European Community's
continued, somewhat time-lagged pursuit of a social democratic agenda, in
spite of the accession to power of conservative governments in Germany and
Britain and the rising themes of supply-side economics and "Eurosclerosis." It
is also possible that business was so profoundly disturbed by the prospect of
European labor law acquiring the capacity to regulate the internal affairs of
multinational corporations that it felt the threat must be disposed of once and
for all. In any case, although the Commission in 1983 watered down its draft
significantly—by limiting its jurisdiction to firms with at least 1,000 employ-
ees and reducing the range and frequency of the information to which work-
forces would be entitled—it was unable to save its proposal. Under heavy fire
from business and with a British veto certain, the Council of Ministers declined
in 1983 to vote on the revised directive and has since failed to take the matter
up again.
The defeat of Vredeling marked the end of the Social Action Programme,
and indeed of the attempts of the 1970s to endow the European Community
with a welfare-state-like social policy. It also documented the exasperation of
business with the post-1970s European Community, as well as its new clout in
EC politics. When after years of stagnation European integration was re-
launched in the mid-1980s, the designated vehicle for this was the Single Mar-
ket program with its deregulatory thrust. It was only several years later that the
Commission returned to social policy in its attempt to add a social dimension
to the increasingly integrated European economy. In this context, workforce
participation reappeared on the European Community's legislative agenda.
After long preparation, the Commission in 1990 issued a draft Directive
on European Works Councils, as a successor or substitute for the Vredeling
directive.
2 Like the latter, the 1990 draft is about workforce information and
consultation rights, it originated in the Social Affairs directorate, and it invokes
article 100 of the Treaty of Rome. It also contains essentially the same rights
for workers as the second, weakened version of Vredeling (EIRR, no. 207
[April 1991]: 27). However, unlike Vredeling the new directive specifies a
structural arrangement, "European works councils," in which workforce infor-
mation and consultation rights are to be vested.
3 Also, while Vredeling made
specified information and consultation arrangements obligatory for firms be-
2. Indeed, the new draft was often referred to in Brussels jargon as the "son of Vredeling." The
text can be found in EIRR, no. 206 (March 1991): 29-32.
3. But it also gives management and labor at the company level the choice to set up alternative
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yond a certain size, the new draft requires that workers, unions, or management
take the initiative in order for a European works council or an equivalent mech-
anism to come into being; at least in principle, this leaves the possibility of
consensual nonapplication of the law.
4 And finally, the 1990 draft is to apply
only to "undertakings or groups of undertakings" that have at least 1,000 em-
ployees and are significantly present, with establishments or group of under-
takings employing 100 workers or more, in at least two EC countries.
5
Works councils, then, have appeared in a number of Commission drafts on
workforce participation: as an alternative to board-level representation in the
1983 draft of the Fifth Directive, as a supplement to it in the 1975 draft of the
European Company Statute, and again as an alternative in its 1989 version.
The presently pending European Works Councils Directive differs from all of
these in that, among other things, the works councils it proposes are to exercise
information and consultation rights only; are to be formed exclusively at the
headquarters of multinational companies; and unlike, for example, the pro-
posed European Company Statute, are not to be elected through a common
procedure, but are to consist of delegates from local plants elected by local
workforce representatives or workforces in accordance with national law and
practice.
6
9.3 Politics of the 1990 Draft Directive
The draft European Works Councils Directive of 1990 was an attempt to
steer clear of the political conflicts and dilemmas that had destroyed Vredeling
and stalled the progress of European company law. Particular care was taken
to accommodate the desire of national governments and union movements, to
protect the integrity and diversity of national industrial relations systems, and
to preempt employer complaints about supranational regulations failing to take
into account "the variety of information and consultation procedures evolved
by companies to suit their particular circumstances" (Hall 1992, 9; see also
Tyszkiewicz 1992).
1. While the first European proposals for legislation on workforce participa-
tion covered all firms above a certain size, the Vredeling draft applied only to
firms with subsidiaries. However, although its language included both national
4. The requirements for triggering the creation of a European works council or some other
information and consultation mechanism are, however, easy to fulfill.
5. According to Sisson et al. (1992), the directive would affect about 880 EC-based firms with
a total of 13.5 million employees, and large parts of an additional 280 multinational companies
based outside the European Community. Of the EC-based firms, 332 are British, and about one-
half of the non-EC companies have a significant British presence. This helps explain the British
government's prominent role in the resistance to the legislation.
6. It is not clear, and has hardly been discussed, how the proposed European works councils
would fit into the workforce participation provisions of the Fifth Directive and the European Com-
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and multinational firms, its principal targets were multinational companies
with their ability to use the exterritoriality of their headquarters to avoid legal
obligations in the host countries of their subsidiaries. During the legislative
process the Commission proposed to confine the directive to multinational
companies only, in an attempt to divide the opposition from business (DeVos
1989). This was countered by the claim that exempting national firms would
place a disincentive on internationalization. The 1990 draft disregards this
point at its own peril, probably to placate national governments by keeping
interference with national industrial relations at a minimum and limiting itself
to the management of externalities and transnational relations.
The new draft also remains exposed to objections from non-European multi-
national companies, especially American and Japanese, that it proposes to
make law with exterritorial applicability outside the European Community. At
the bottom of this is, again, a problem of competition. To avoid giving non-
European multinationals an advantage over European multinationals, the
Vredeling directive tried to subject the former to the same obligations vis-a-
vis their European subsidiary workforces as the latter. Lacking better means,
Vredeling proposed legally to designate a non-European company's largest
plant in the European Community as its headquarters for the purposes of com-
pliance with European information and consultation requirements. In addition
to forceful opposition from the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels
and a legion of American business lobbyists, this caused diplomatic interven-
tions by the United States and Japan against what was claimed to be an attempt
to extend European law to American and Japanese corporate citizens operating
in their home countries. It has been argued that this contributed heavily to
Vredeling's defeat (DeVbs 1989). The present, successor draft takes the same
approach to exterritoriality and is therefore likely to generate the same opposi-
tion. Excluding non-European multinationals from its ambit offers no solution,
however, as it would again raise the issue of fair competition.
2. Under both the Fifth Directive and Vredeling, participation provisions
were to be obligatory for all firms that fell under the proposed legislation.
This is different for the European Company Statute, in that incorporation under
European law was always intended to be the voluntary decision of the individ-
ual firm. In this sense, the participation provisions under European company
law are optional. The draft directive of 1990 makes having a European works
council, or an alternative information and consultation arrangement, a little
less than fully obligatory by requiring triggering activities that must originate
inside the company.
3. The first proposals on workforce participation were highly prescriptive
in that they laid down detailed legal rules that firms were required to follow.
Later versions, beginning with the second draft of the Fifth Directive in 1983,
offered firms a menu of alternative rules and structures among which they were
to be free to choose. The 1990 European Works Councils Directive also takes
this approach by giving firms the option of selecting alternative mechanisms254 Wolfgang Streeck and Sigurt Vitols
for information and consultation, to the extent that they fulfill certain minimum
requirements. Like the triggering procedure, this responds to business de-
mands for "flexibility." But it also accommodates reservations among Euro-
pean unions about works councils, whether politically or nationally motivated,
and allows national unions without a works council tradition to seek more ex-
pedient arrangements with European multinationals based in their countries.
4. While originally EC legislation sought direct legal regulation of work-
force participation rights and structures, the 1983 draft of the Fifth Directive
was the first to include a collective bargaining option allowing firms and
unions to negotiate their own solutions.
7 This approach was always popular
with unions less comfortable than, in particular, German unions with legis-
lated, as distinguished from bargained, rights. The draft European Works
Councils Directive assigns bargaining a prominent role in three respects: the
triggering of works council formation, the determination of the representative
structure that is to exercise workforce information and consultation rights, and
the exact definition of those rights. By empowering collective bargaining in
this way, the draft directive dissociates itself from a "second-channel" concept
of industrial democracy and abandons previous ambitions to reform national
industrial relations systems into this mold.
5. Much of EC legislation, proposed or enacted, tried to promote harmoni-
zation of rules and procedures across countries. The Vredeling directive was
partly an exception to this in that it gave (albeit "harmonized") information
and consultation rights to a variety of national mechanisms of workforce repre-
sentation. Its 1990 successor diverges even further from harmonization.
8 While
it suggests building a unified representative structure at multinational head-
quarters—the European works council—council members are to be selected
according to very different national practices. Moreover, the limitation of the
draft to multinationals, leaving national firms untouched; the—remote—possi-
bility of having no information and consultation system at all; the menu charac-
ter of the directive; the strong role for collective bargaining, making it possible
for almost anything in the directive to be rewritten; and the draft's unquestion-
ing acceptance of the legitimacy of existing national representation arrange-
ments together amount to a strong endorsement of national and company vari-
ety and document the extreme reluctance on the part of the European
Community to interfere with existing arrangements.
9
7. Analytically, this is different from a menu-type directive that offers a set of alternatives for
firms to select from.
8. In this it concurs with the second draft of the European Company Statute, which, while
offering firms a menu of choices, also allows countries to limit those choices by national law to
two or just one of the models in the directive. Countries may in this way preserve "national diver-
sity" by shielding "their" firms from potentially uncomfortable forms of co-determination or by
insulating established national practices from external, supranational pressures for change (Hepple
1990, 313).
9. "Indeed the approach adopted is essentially the mutual recognition of the different national
systems of employee representation as the appropriate channels for the nomination of members of
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The Commission's new strategy in drafting the 1990 directive was only
partly successful. More than its predecessors, the draft managed to reassure
unions outside Germany that it was not another attempt to export the German
model to the rest of the European Community. Moreover, it spared European
union confederations the embarrassment of having to choose between nation-
ally and ideologically sacrosanct principles like union-based and second-
channel forms of workplace representation, legally mandated co-determination
and voluntary collective bargaining, and bargaining at the company and sec-
toral levels. But while unions remained united behind the proposal, employers
continued to be adamantly opposed, insisting that information and consultation
in multinational European firms can come about only case by case and volunta-
rily.
1
0 Governments, for their part, never even discussed the draft in the Coun-
cil, neither before the Maastricht Treaty when passage would still have required
unanimity and a British veto was certain, nor in the two turbulent years after.
9.4 Defeat of the Social Dimension
The move from harmonization to accommodation of diversity, and from pre-
scriptive to "flexible" forms of legislation, is also visible in the evolution of
the other proposals on workplace representation and corresponds to a general
change in the late 1980s in the EC approach to social policy that we have
elsewhere described as "neovoluntarism" (Streeck 1992, 1995): an emerging
commitment to a decentralized regulatory regime with a preference for "soft"
over "hard" law, and "private" over "public" order, operating under a "variable
geometry" of participants that are protected from central intervention by ample
opportunities for "opting out," as well as by a general presumption of prece-
dence of both local traditions and market forces over universal normative regu-
lation.
The ideological underpinning for neovoluntarism was provided by a laissez-
faire reinterpretation of the social Catholic principle of "subsidiarity." Initially,
subsidiarity was introduced by the embattled Commission in its desperate
search for a formula for a mutually acceptable division of powers between the
European Community and its member states. Like its original, the EC version
asserts the priority of "self-regulation" by "smaller social units" at "lower lev-
els" of political organization and civil society. But traditionally, subsidiarity
also implied a capacity, and indeed an obligation, for the central state to ensure
that the outcomes of self-regulation were compatible with general norms of
social justice. Typically, this involved public "subsidies" to weaker social
groups, often in the form of legal and institutional support to enable them to
look after their own affairs or to assert themselves in relation to better-endowed
10. A concise summary of the position of UNICE, the European peak association of employers,
is given in EIRR, no. 207 (April 1991): 27, to the effect that allegedly the draft "takes no account
of national legislation, employers' authority, the autonomy of the 'social partners,' and economic
necessities."256 Wolfgang Streeck and Sigurt Vitols
adversaries. This, in turn, required a state strong enough not to have to take the
existing distribution of power and collective action capacity in civil society for
granted, and capable of reconstituting private autonomy as a devolved mandate
for socially balanced and responsible self-governance.
The defeat of the Commission's federalist welfare-state-building project was
reflected in a gradual reinterpretation of subsidiarity in EC discourse. Step by
step, subsidiarity came to mean simply that nothing should be regulated by the
European Community that could "as well or better" be regulated at lower lev-
els of governance. But what is better or as good may depend entirely on one's
interests and objectives. Reduced to a technical formula empty of normative
content, subsidiarity was increasingly invoked by the Commission's opponents
in their effort to obstruct the development of supranational state capacity as a
formula for legitimating whatever either nation-states or the empirical distribu-
tion of market power had decided, not decided, or decided not to decide. In
this way, subsidiarity turned into yet another version of liberalism.
It was in the early 1990s, before and after the signing of the Maastricht
Treaty, that the harsh political realities reflected by the European Community's
new subsidiarity formula became visible. In principle, the treaty should have
made passage of worker participation legislation easier. The Single European
Act of 1986 had introduced "qualified majority voting" among member states
on the Council for measures "which have as their object the establishment and
functioning of the Internal Market" (article 100a). However, "the rights and
interests of employed persons" were excepted from this and could, as before,
be decided only unanimously. The exception here, in turn, was "improvements,
especially in the working environment, as regards the health and safety of
workers" (article 118a), which came under qualified majority voting. In 1990,
the Commission rejected suggestions to introduce the European Works Coun-
cils Directive as a health and safety measure, or to base it on article 100a on
the grounds that information and consultation rights affected competition in
the Internal Market (Hall 1992). Passage of the draft at the time of its presenta-
tion therefore required unanimity of the Council.
There was, however, hope that this would soon change. The intergovernmen-
tal conferences that eventually produced the Maastricht Treaty were expected
to agree on a package of institutional reforms that would significantly enhance
the political capacities of the European Community. In the social policy area,
the Commission's central proposal was to extend qualified majority voting to a
range of subjects beyond health and safety, thereby improving the chances of
social dimension proposals, including workplace representation, being passed
into law.
As it turned out, qualified majority voting could be made to apply only
among 11 of the 12 member states, with Britain gaining permission from the
others to dissociate itself from EC social policy entirely. Substantively, the so-
cial policy agreement signed by the Eleven amended the Treaty of Rome to
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consultation of workers." Another category of issues, however, among them
"representation and collective defense of the interests of workers, includ-
ing co-determination," continued to require unanimous decisions, if only
among the Eleven. While Britain can no longer prevent the other countries from
acting on them, any one of the others can, if willing to play the "British"
part."
Treaty ratification came only at the price of additional formal commitments
to laissez-faire subsidiarity. Even apart from these, the treaty as signed made
it anything but easy for meaningful social policy legislation to be passed, even
among the new "social policy community" of the Eleven. The British "opt-
out" raises a host of technical and "constitutional" questions that are so forbid-
dingly complex that they will likely stall any nontrivial legislative initiative.
Not only will the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice over social pol-
icy legislation passed by the Eleven be challenged. More important, to the
extent that the Eleven may try to impose participation regimes on firms in their
countries, these may appeal to the Court or the Commission against what could
be construed as a competitive disadvantage against British firms, as these
would remain unaffected while continuing to enjoy unlimited market access
throughout the European Community. In particular, if the Eleven were to pass
a works councils directive, British multinationals, while in all other respects
corporate European citizens, would technically have to be treated as exterrito-
rial in the same way as American or Japanese multinationals—which would
re-create inside the European Community the same problems that helped de-
feat the first Vredeling proposal.
1
2
Various observers have expressed the expectation that the "co-decision pro-
cedure" instituted by the Maastricht Treaty may make EC legislation on work-
force participation easier to achieve. Under the Protocol on Social Policy, EC
legislative powers on social policy matters, again only for the Eleven, may
be jointly exercised by the European peak associations of business and labor,
allowing in principle for a corporatist devolution of law making to organized
social groups (Streeck 1994). It is hard to see, however, why European employ-
ers, having successfully prevented passage of a works councils directive in the
Council, should agree to it being passed through tripartite bargaining. Usually,
11. Company law, such as the Fifth Directive or the European Company Statute, remains entirely
outside the scope of the Protocol on Social Policy and thus continues to be subject to unanimity
among all 12 EC members.
12. Like American firms, firms with headquarters in Britain that did not want to have a multina-
tional works council or to comply with information and consultation obligations could refuse to
obey "foreign" law and ask their government to protect them, and itself, from intrusion by a foreign
government. To avoid writing unenforceable and technically illegal law for "foreign" citizens act-
ing in "foreign" countries—i.e., multinationals based and incorporated in Britain—the Eleven
would have to designate the largest subsidiary of a British multinational in the Eleven countries as
its "headquarters" liable under "Eleven" law. As has been noted above, this problem is far from
trivial given the large number of British or British-based firms potentially affected by the draft di-
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constructive participation of employers in corporatist political exchange, far
from being a substitute for union strength or interventionist state capacities,
presupposes at least one of the two, so employers can accept negotiated settle-
ments as a "lesser evil" compared to industrial conflict or direct state interven-
tion. Where, as in the European Community, both unions and state capacities
are weak, institutionalized functional representation is much more likely to be
used by employers to prevent regulation—which is exactly what UNICE has
announced it will do with its newly formalized participation rights.
1
3
Faced with protracted employer opposition, the Commission may ultimately
give in and refrain from formal legislation once again. This would certainly
not be a break with the trend of the past decade. Quite to the contrary, full
adoption of a voluntaristic approach would be in line with the long-term evolu-
tion of EC social policy, as signified especially by the nonbinding status of
the "Social Charter" and the successive rewriting of proposed participation
legislation to conform to an ever more liberally interpreted "subsidiarity" prin-
ciple. Ultimately, unmitigated reliance on voluntarism would probably be no
more than a realistic recognition by the European Community of its vanishing
prospects of ever acquiring the capacity to impose binding social obligations
on Europe's most powerful corporate citizens, or to assist a nationally frag-
mented European civil society in organizing a collective response to the spread
of transnational markets and organizations.
9.5 Rise of Voluntarism: "European Works Councils" in
Multinational Firms
Since the mid-1980s a number of European multinationals and their work-
forces have agreed to set up supranational workforce information and consulta-
tion arrangements, usually referred to as "European works councils." By the
end of 1991, 18 of the 100 largest European multinationals in manufacturing
had either established a European works council or were planning to do so in
13. After an initial discussion, the Council of Ministers in the fall of 1993 forwarded the draft
directive, with minor changes, to the social partners under the co-decision procedure. Hopes are
being expressed that the procedure will conclude in the winter of 1994, when under the German
presidency there might be an opportunity for council legislation to be passed. Considerable caution
is advised, however. This will be the first time the procedure will be used, and since there is as yet
no agreement on how it is to operate, all sides will be anxious not to create unfavorable precedents.
More important, UNICE insists that deliberations among the social partners must start from a
tabula rasa and must not be limited to the Commission draft, as amended by the Council; the
unions, to the contrary, want a swift discussion after which the draft is to be returned to the Council.
In particular, they reject the view of the employers that the procedure amounts to a mandate to
find a "negotiated" solution. Substantively, UNICE offers to accept a works councils directive on
the condition that it provides for negotiated solutions on a company-by-company basis, without a
statutory fallback option in case no agreement can be reached. In practice, this would make Euro-
pean works councils depend entirely on employer discretion. (Footnote added at the time of the
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the near future.
1
4 Two companies had two councils each,
1
5 making for a total
of 20 European works councils.
The morphology of the 20 European works councils that were established
by 1991
1
6 reflects their voluntary character and the absence of normative legis-
lation. Voluntary European works councils are highly diverse in their organiza-
tional structures; their diversity reflects national differences; at the same time,
they all have in common that as European-level bodies, they are union based
and terminable at will by either side; and they are strictly limited in their func-
tions, especially with respect to their capacity to interfere with managerial pre-
rogative.
1. Only 8 of the 20 councils rest on a formal agreement between manage-
ment and labor. In four companies, council operation is based on informal
verbal understandings; in another two, meetings are organized and worker rep-
resentatives invited at management initiative. A number of councils include
management, and some are chaired by employer representatives, while the oth-
ers are worker-only bodies. On 11 councils, workers are represented exclu-
sively by company employees; 2 others consist entirely of full-time union offi-
cials; the rest include both (table 9.1).
Diversity extends also to the selection of council members. In two firms,
each union organizing workers at a national subsidiary is given one seat. In
other cases, seats are allocated to countries according to their percentage in the
company's workforce, with delegate selection governed by national practice; if
there is multiunionism in a country, the national quota is divided up in propor-
tion to unions' relative strength. There are no simultaneous, companywide,
14. The data used for this study is based on a survey of the experience with European works
councils of the 100 largest multinational manufacturing companies in Europe. This makes the
present study the one with the highest number of cases under investigation. Other studies include
Northrup, Slowinski, and Campbell (1988), which covers three companies; Gold and Hall (1992),
which reports on 11 companies with 13 councils; European Trade Union Institute (1991), which
looks at 13 councils at 12 companies; and Myrvang (1991), which is concerned only with Scandi-
navian firms.
15. Two European works council-type bodies went into operation at Thomson in 1986, one
involving unions affiliated to the European Metalworkers' Federation (EMF), the other involving
employees chosen to represent the different national workforces. Under a recent agreement the
two councils will be merged in 1993. BSN set up a European Consultation Committee for its food
and drink division in 1987, and a European Information Committee for its glass division in 1990.
16. Information on the companies and on existing or planned European works councils was
gathered through a mailed questionnaire. Supplementary data was drawn from reports in the busi-
ness and industrial relations press, from companies' annual reports, and from previous studies.
Particularly useful sources were the studies by Myrvang (1991) and by Gold and Hall (1992).
Northrup and Rowan (1979) provided information on international union activities in 39 of the
100 firms during the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, a small number of interviews were conducted
with representatives of both labor and industry. (For a description of the method used in selecting
firms and respondents, see appendixes A and B). The sample includes a number of companies
based in the United States, Sweden, and Switzerland in addition to those based in EC countries.
These companies were included because they are large employers within the European Commu-
nity and would be subject to European works council legislation.260 Wolfgang Streeck and Sigurt Vitols
Table 9.1 Composition of European Works Council (EWC) Delegations
Type of Delegation Number of EWCs
Union officials 2
Employee representatives 11
Union officials and employee representatives 5
Management invitation 2
Total 20
direct elections of European works councils; as a result, members of the same
council may have different terms of office and are likely to have been selected
in very different ways.
2. Many of the differences between European works councils are related to
their companies' country of origin. The very existence of European works
councils seems conditioned by a company's national industrial relations sys-
tem. Of the 18 companies in our sample that have European works councils,
no fewer than 17 have their headquarters in countries with some kind of works
council or industrial democracy legislation: 6 in France, 5 in Germany, and 4
in Sweden (table 9.2).
1
7 And while U.S.- or U.K.-based companies make up 41
percent of the sample and include some of the largest European multinationals,
none of them have a European works council.
National origin is also reflected in the institutional structure of European
works councils. In three of the four Swedish-based multinationals, works
councils are essentially meeting sites for shop stewards and union workplace
officials, with part of the meetings devoted to a presentation by management
on the company's economic situation.
1
8 This arrangement is in keeping with
the union-based construction of workplace representation in Sweden. Simi-
larly, at French companies councils are joint management-labor committees,
while at German multinationals they are made up solely of workforce represen-
tatives, again mirroring national industrial relations systems.
Furthermore, national factors influence the degree to which multinational
information and consultation arrangements are formalized. At least five of the
17. The remaining company is Nestle, which is based in Switzerland. Nestle is said, however,
to enjoy a close relationship with the French state and French banks, as illustrated by the recent
Perrier takeover. It is also reported that the European works council at Nestle originated in an
agreement between the German food workers' union (Gewerkschaft Nahrung-GenuB-Gaststatten)
and the president of Nestle Europe (Gold and Hall 1992, 22).
18. In one case, the council is de facto a world union council organized by the International
Metalworkers' Federation. The fourth Swedish-based company has what could be called a second
Swedish variant of European works councils, which includes representatives of the white- and
blue-collar union federations from each of the Scandinavian countries in which the company has
operations. This version, which involves the direct appointment of a limited number of union
representatives, first appeared at a small company outside our sample in 1989; Scandinavian
unions have seen the case as a precedent for spreading union involvement at the multinational






















































six German councils have been or will be established under a formal agreement
signed by the two sides or by a supervisory board resolution.
1
9 The European
works council at Bayer has been set up under an agreement negotiated between
the national chemical workers' union (IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik) and its
counterpart employers' association (Bundesarbeitgeberverband Chemie) on
the structure and functions of Europe-wide works councils in the chemical
industry; the same agreement will govern the councils at BASF and Hoechst.
By contrast, in France where collective bargaining is less widely accepted,
only four of the nine councils are based on formal agreement; two were estab-
lished by an exchange of letters; one, by verbal informal agreement; and two,
in keeping with the paternalistic traditions of French management, by manage-
ment invitation to individual employees.
3. Regardless of considerable differences in this respect between national
industrial relations systems, all European works councils are exclusively union
based, always involving national unions and sometimes, in addition, European
union federations. In all firms, with the exception of the two attendance-by-
invitation arrangements, the national unions organizing the various subsidiar-
ies control the selection of delegates, and this also applies where delegates are
employed by the company and are not full-time union officials. In fact, existing
European works councils more resemble international union committees for
multinational companies than works councils proper. While they share with
the latter that their expenses are paid by the employer, they have no union-
independent legal or organizational resources that would enable them to func-
tion as a second channel of representation.
The union-based character of European works councils is closely related to
the absence of legal intervention and regulation at the EC level, helping make
councils acceptable to national union movements that lack positive experience
19. Information on the sixth German European works council is missing.262 Wolfgang Streeck and Sigurt Vitols
with legally based workplace representation. But union hegemony also seems
welcome to German unions, which in their own system require elaborate legal
and organizational provisions to protect their primacy over independently re-
sourced works councils and to prevent these from succumbing to "enterprise
patriotism." Present European-level practice ensures that it is unions and not
national, or supranational, works councillors that dominate European works
councils. In fact, in the German-based companies in our sample, it was because
of union efforts that European works councils came into existence, with both
the metalworkers' and the chemical workers' unions having to put pressure,
not just on management, but also on domestic works council members.
2
0
Voluntarism and the union-based status of European works councils imply
that councils can be terminated at any time by either side. In practice, of
course, termination is less likely to issue from unions than from employers,
for whom it constitutes a forceful sanction against councils overstepping their
bounds. A widely visible precedent for this was set by the Dutch electronics
manufacturer, Philips, one of the pioneers in the voluntary establishment of
workforce information arrangements involving union representatives from for-
eign subsidiaries. Between 1967 and 1972, Philips held four formal meetings
on Europe-wide issues with workforce representatives from its European
plants. A fifth meeting, however, was canceled by the company, and no further
meetings were called, apparently because the unions, under the leadership of
the EMF, were planning to demand a multinational collective agreement on
reduction of working hours without loss of pay, as well as harmonization of
redundancy rules (interview; Northrup and Rowan 1979, 145-50). Today, Phil-
ips is among the most vocal opponents of the draft European Works Councils
Directive.
4. The high diversity that characterizes the structures of voluntary European
works councils is not, however, found in their functions. Only one of the 20
councils in the sample—that at Volkswagen—has rights, not just to informa-
tion, but also to consultation. With impressive uniformity, the functional do-
main of voluntary European works councils falls short of the draft directive
in that it is limited to the exercise of voluntarily conceded and unilaterally
withdrawable information rights. While some firms claim that council meet-
ings do involve two-way communication, with employee representatives hav-
ing an opportunity to express their views, there are no explicit consultation
rights in these cases, and councils are pure information bodies.
2
1 Topics on the
20. These members may have preferred not to share their influence on company management at
headquarters with unionists from foreign countries and officials from international union confed-
erations.
21. In a number of French firms (Bull, Elf Aquitaine, Thomson, and Pechiney), management
claims that an ongoing "dialogue" and exchange of viewpoints is occurring, and the BSN Euro-
pean works council in its food and drink division has established a "program of joint work" on a
number of industrial relations issues; in none of the French cases, however, do worker representa-
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agenda of European works council meetings include the company's general
financial situation, changes in its organization, rationalization plans, mergers
and acquisitions, training and retraining policies, as well as general marketing,
production, and investment strategies (table 9.3). Typical border-crossing is-
sues, however, such as employee mobility between countries and allocation
of work between plants, are surprisingly infrequent. In even fewer cases are
traditional subjects of collective bargaining discussed; for example, wages are
mentioned only once, the exception again being Volkswagen, and vacations
and working time only twice.
2
2
Volkswagen, of course, has long been the privileged site for the powerful
German metalworkers' union, IG Metall, seeking and gaining breakthrough
industrial agreements. That it today has the most advanced European works
council arrangement is therefore not surprising.
2
3 Nor is it out of the ordinary
that IG Metall and the EMF are together using the Volkswagen model to push
for extension of consultation rights to all European works councils—as well
as for the resources necessary for such rights to be meaningfully exercised
(more frequent meetings, the right for unions and worker representatives to
initiate meetings, preparatory meetings for workforce representatives, and
facilities for these to remain in contact with each other). It is at this point,
however, that all other European employers take exception (Gold and Hall
1992). And while in Germany advances made at Volkswagen can in principle
be transferred to other employers through subsequent collective bargaining
with an industrywide employers' association, no such mechanism exists at the
European level, and nothing suggests that it may in the foreseeable future.
It is with respect to formal consultation rights that the emerging reality of
voluntary European works councils refuses most conspicuously to fit the pro-
posed EC legislation. The difference between mandatory and voluntary work-
place representation is the difference between information and consultation
rights, and information rights only. Consultation seems available to workforces
only as a result of public intervention, even though it involves no more than
minimal interference with managerial prerogative.
2
4 The study of European
22. The agenda of European works council meetings was the most difficult item on which to
get complete information. Many of the companies returned their questionnaires incomplete, and
press reports on the content of discussions tend to be sketchy.
23. Although the company was less than enthusiastic about having to be the avant garde again.
For a time, management at Volkswagen cooperated with what was in effect a European workforce
information arrangement, while refusing to call it a European works council or to sign a formal
agreement on it. This reflected its experience in Germany, where the company has often come
under fire from other employers that had to fall in line with precedents won by Volkswagen's strong
union and, especially, works council. Nota bene that even at Volkswagen, the consultation rights
of the European works council are limited to cross-border shifts in production and investment
(Gester and Bobke 1992, 8).
24. To be sure, even the draft directive never comes close to creating rights to co-determination,
i.e., to the—however limited—power sharing at the workplace that has come to be associated
with works councils in countries like Germany and the Netherlands. Even more than consultation,
co-determination is unlikely to emerge from negotiated agreement under a voluntaristic
framework.264 Wolfgang Streeck and Sigurt Vitols
Table 9.3 Agenda Items at European Works Council Meetings
Item Number of Times Mentioned
Company's economic/financial position 7
Rationalization plans 7
Changes in company organization 7
Production and sales 6
Acquisitions and mergers 6
Investment programs 5
Location of new plant 5
Training and retraining 5
Health and safety 5
Marketing strategies 4
Plant cutbacks or closures 4
Employee mobility between countries 3
Manufacturing and work methods 3
Employee benefits 3





works councils confirms that if workforce participation is to include "voice,"
that is, is to be more than "ear," it must be based on more than the withdrawable
goodwill or volatile sense of expediency of employers, or the conjuncturally
sensitive market power of unions. Works councils that are to provide workers




9.6 Sources of Voluntarism
There are conflicting views on the relationship between the emergence of
voluntary European works councils and the legislative proposals of the Euro-
pean Commission. One position, compatible with optimism on the eventual
evolution of a federal European social welfare state, sees voluntary councils as
preparing the way for mandated councils (Hall 1992). Contrary to this is the
belief that voluntary councils may potentially make formal legislation unneces-
sary or defuse political pressures for it. Both views are present among unions
25. Words are not important—unless they hide important distinctions and obscure crucial is-
sues. Note that many German unionists object to the term, "European works council" since the
arrangements to which it refers lack the legally enforceable rights German works councils have.
Interestingly, German employers, knowing what real works councils are and how constraining they
can be, do not like the term either. Bayer, e.g., insists on calling its council "Bayerforum" or
"Euroforum," where "forum" is to emphasize that the council's only function can be the exchange
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as well as employers. Interestingly, while a majority of European union leaders
hope that voluntary councils will expedite future legislation, many employers
seem to expect that they will substitute for it. The ironic result is a developing
convergence between employers and unions on the desirability of voluntary
European works councils, for opposite strategic reasons.
It is not hard to see why European unions should today be willing to seek
voluntary European works councils. In the 1970s, they had consistently argued
that voluntary arrangements for workforce participation in multinational com-
panies were not enough and that binding normative regulation, through either
collective bargaining or supranational legislation, was indispensable. Later,
however, they found the legislative road to European works councils closed
by the apparently invincible coalition of European employers and the British
government. Essentially, pressing for voluntary councils in the hope that these
would get them closer to mandated ones was all that was left to them. There
also was a need for European-level union officials to define a promising project
for themselves that they could present to their national constituents. Not least,
an important benefit that even voluntary European works councils do deliver
is subsidized international communication between unions in multinational
companies; for most unions, the costs of travel and translation for meetings at
the European company level are prohibitively high.
While unions seem to have little to lose from voluntary European works
councils, it is less clear why employers should have agreed to them. Voluntary
alternatives to mandatory information and consultation arrangements in multi-
national firms have always figured prominently in the rhetoric of European
employers. In the 1970s, employers argued that they were already voluntarily
observing various international codes of good conduct for multinational
firms—such as those developed by the ILO and the OECD—that included
rules on workforce information; formal EC legislation was therefore unneces-
sary (DeVos 1989; Teague and Grahl 1991). This position was vulnerable to
being periodically discredited by instances of manifest disregard of codes,
sometimes found in the firms of the very same national or European employer
spokesmen designated to sell voluntary compliance to the public as an alterna-
tive to legislative regulation. Later, survey studies showed a high percentage
of large European firms, including some based in Britain, claiming that they
had on their own introduced procedures for workforce participation or were
thinking of doing so because of their expected economic benefits. Still, it was
only during the battle over the social dimension that voluntary European works
came to be en vogue.
16
Two explanations are commonly offered for this, a political and an economic
one. The former considers employer agreement to voluntary European works
26. No fewer than 11 of the 15 companies for which a council founding date is known estab-
lished their councils after the passage of the Social Charter and the circulation by the European
Commission of its proposed European Works Councils Directive.266 Wolfgang Streeck and Sigurt Vitols
councils as an attempt to preempt supranational legislation. Circulation of the
draft European Works Councils Directive is believed to have given rise to dis-
putes among employers on whether voluntary European works councils could
be presented to a potentially prounion European legislator as a superior alter-
native to mandatory councils or whether they might have the unwelcome side-
effect of legitimating legislation in the future, making it more difficult for com-
panies to argue that councils are dangerous to their economic health. Firms
that have agreed to European works councils would have done so because they
have come to accept the first of the two positions.
If valid, a political explanation of voluntary councils would indicate that the
European Community had in the late 1980s developed a credible capacity to
threaten international companies with prescriptive legislative intervention un-
less they complied with EC policy on their own. What is more, the European
Community would have succeeded in breaking up the solidarity of European
employers, making some of them subject themselves to regulations that future
legislation could then spread to all. In this, the European Community would
have been able to apply political power to business in a way that in the past
was typically associated with advanced nation-states.
An explanation of voluntary councils by anticipatory compliance of employ-
ers with potential European legislation would seem to be supported by the
timing of council formation.
2
7 On the other hand, only a very small number of
firms actually did set up councils, and all except one refused to allow them
rights to consultation, as opposed to just information—in clear defiance of EC
policy. Moreover, given the firm lock that employers had established on EC
social policies in the 1980s, it is hard to see how the Commission would have
been able to get formal legislation passed if companies had closed ranks and
refused to introduce councils voluntarily as a lesser evil. Indeed, one might
wonder why European employers did not have more confidence in their ability
to defeat the 1990 draft as soundly as its predecessor; their political position
had certainly not deteriorated since 1984. It is also not clear why European
employers, if preempting legislation by voluntary arrangements was such an




Economic explanations regard voluntary council formation as a response to
economic efficiency imperatives derive from basically two factors: changes in
companies in response to internationalization and new demands on labor rela-
tions in "post-Fordist" workplaces. The assumptions that inform such accounts
27. There are also examples of firms explicitly motivating their acceptance of European works
councils by the expectation that this may forestall EC legislation. Specifically, this is said to apply
to the French companies Rhone-Poulenc and St. Gobain (Gold and Hall 1992). Also, the German
chemical industry is reported to have signed its European works councils agreement with the
German chemical workers' union primarily to avoid EC legislation (Lamparter 1991, 75).
28. Explaining councils as a device to preempt EC legislation also fails to account for the pres-
ence of European works councils in Swedish firms. Sweden is not an EC member and would not
be affected by a potential directive.267 Europe: Between Mandatory Consultation and Voluntary Information
are summarized by Northrup et al.: "Complex issues pertaining to human re-
source management, arising in the 1980s and expected to continue into the
1990s, point to the need for labor and management to co-operate in exchanging
information and ideas. The introduction of new technology, the restructuring
of industry and the efforts to unite Europe provide the framework for extended
union-management consultation in the years ahead where the parties desire it
and find it helpful" (1988, 540).
Politically, economic-functionalist explanations imply that workplace repre-
sentation comes about on its own if required by economic conditions and does
not need legislation. The fact that voluntarily instituted councils have only in-
formation and no consultation or co-determination rights simply means that
only the former and not the latter are economically efficient; if the latter were,
they too would have been instituted voluntarily.
Assuming that firms undergoing internationalization experience increased
needs for multinational communication with their workforces, efficiency ex-
planations seem to be supported by the coincidence of council formation with
the wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in Europe in the second half
of the 1980s that was an intended consequence of the Internal Market pro-
gram.
2
9 None of the presently existing councils on which we have a founding
date was formed before 1986, the year the program was launched. Also, most
of the restructuring was concentrated in a few sectors, with chemicals and food
processing alone accounting for half of all intra-EC mergers and acquisitions
(Kay 1991, 360), and multinational companies in such sectors appear to be
more likely to have European works councils (table 9.4).
3
0
There are, however, reasons to question the logic of managerialist accounts
for council formation. Again, the number of firms that avail themselves of the
presumed economic benefits of European works councils remains small. Per-
haps more important, while few employers disagree with the notion that a
"modern enterprise" exposed to unpredictable markets and using fast-changing
technology requires the "active involvement" of its workforce, to what extent
this includes information or consultation rights for workforce representatives
at the supranational level is far from obvious. Employer pronouncements on
the subject support the impression that workforce involvement, to be justifiable
29. In the industrial sector, the number of national mergers and acquisitions, involving large
companies in one EC country, more than doubled (from 101 to 214) between 1984 and 1988. The
number of cross-border mergers within the European Community almost quadrupled (from 29 to
111) in the same period (Kay 1991, 360). The process extended beyond the borders of the Euro-
pean Community to neighboring European countries, with companies based in Switzerland and
Sweden especially eager to expand their presence inside the European Community.
30. The agreements at BSN and Thomson, in which management is said to have sought union
involvement in anticipation of major restructuring programs, are cited as examples of management
interest in the efficiency advantages of European works councils (Northrup et al. 1988, 525). More
recent interviews indicate that, on the whole, managers seem to hold positive views about their
experiences with European works councils and about their efficiency contribution (Gold and
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Table 9.4 Multinational Companies and European Works Councils by Industry
Number of MNCs MNCs with EWCs





Metals and metal products
Industrial and farm equipment
Petroleum refining
Building materials
Motor vehicles and parts
Food, drink, and tobacco
Forest products
Publishing and printing
























































by managerial efficiency concerns, would above all have to be production or
workplace centered. Production-related decisions in multinational firms, how-
ever, are often, and perhaps increasingly, made locally. If workforce involve-
ment is to be limited to such decisions, it must not be centralized. Moreover,
while local involvement may, if well managed, remain focused on common
interests in high productivity and competitiveness, centralization entails the
risk of discussions extending to more adversarial subjects, such as finance and
investment. From a managerial perspective, not only do workers have no spe-
cial expertise to contribute in these areas, but involving workers in them is also
likely to give rise to conflicts or delay urgent decisions and thereby frustrate
the very purposes of "involvement." Not least, centralized information require-
ments may force a company to keep managerial functions centralized even if
economic needs would demand devolution to local decision makers.
9.7 A National Theory of Supranational Works Councils
If neither EC politics nor economic efficiency pressures can account for the
spread of voluntary European works councils, a better explanation may be one
that takes off from their structural diversity, functional weakness, and uneven
national distribution. In this view, voluntary supranational works councils are
rooted in diverse national political and institutional conditions, especially the
power and access to political and legal resources of national unions and em-
ployers. While on the surface "European," they are in reality the products of269 Europe: Between Mandatory Consultation and Voluntary Information
nationally different government policies, legal systems, industrial relations
practices, union strategies, managerial power structures, and the like.
A national theory of supranational works council formation does not have
to claim that supranational politics is without influence. However, rather than
explaining the appearance of voluntary European works councils as a preemp-
tive response to European legislation, it emphasizes its simultaneity with the
change in European social policy toward voluntarism—a change which reas-
sured employers that there will precisely not be an activist European legislator
waiting to exploit voluntary councils for legitimation of legislative interven-
tion. That is, employers have agreed to voluntary European works councils,
not because these are necessarily economically efficient or provide protection
against European-level social policy activism, but because they have become
unlikely to precipitate statutory enactment. Given, not the strength but, on the
contrary, the weakness of European welfare state federalism, employers felt
confident enough by the end of the 1980s to accommodate whatever other
political pressures there may have been for European works councils, the pos-
sible costs of accommodation having become so small as to no longer justify
the costs of resistance.
Above all, pressures and incentives for firms to agree to supranational works
councils grow out of the politics in and around national industrial relations.
While national legislation cannot be used directly to set up supranational coun-
cils, bargaining power derived form it can. In countries with strong union and
council rights, worker representatives may have enough power to make interna-
tionalizing firms extend council arrangements to the multinational level. As
multinational management becomes increasingly differentiated from home-
country national-level management, access to the former for national-level
works councils may depend on the formation of a supranational council. With
the growing importance of such access for national interest representation, na-
tional works councils may become willing to expend political capital on mak-
ing management agree to supranational works councils, even though these in-
volve sharing influence with workforce representatives from foreign subsidiary
plants. Concerns over this among home-country works councillors should be
lower in countries where councils are well established and well resourced,
making it unlikely for them to be outcompeted by foreign council members
more knowledgeable in council operations. Moreover, subsidiarity and the ab-
sence of supranational legislation make it possible for home-country councils
to design supranational councils close to their domestic tradition, further ce-
menting their hegemony on the council. Not least, limitation of supranational
councils to information functions may reassure home-country councils en-
dowed under national law with consultation or co-determination rights that the
influence of foreign councillors will not exceed theirs.
Unions, for their part, should be more comfortable with works councils in
countries where they have had time to learn to live with councils and control
them. In fact, European works councils, as we have seen, make it possible for270 Wolfgang Streeck and Sigurt Vitols
unions in countries with strong national works councils to insert themselves
directly in the international industrial relations of large firms, which might
otherwise be controlled by management and works councils alone. Manage-
ment in countries with strong works councils may have their own reasons to
find voluntary supranational councils attractive, not least as a means of coun-
terbalancing the national council in the home country with workforce represen-
tatives from foreign plants with sometimes different interests.
The spectacular growth of European works councils in large French-based
multinationals would seem to require a special, although again nation-specific
explanation. While works councils do have some legal rights in France, union
confidence in them as a channel of representation is low, and union control over
councils is precarious due to multiunionism. Like French industrial relations in
general, however, works councils in France are highly politicized. National as
well as supranational works councils are often used by management and mod-
erate unions, especially the CFDT, to isolate the largest union, the CGT, which
has close links to the Communist party.
3
1 There also seems to have been pres-
sure from the Socialist government on large companies that were either nation-
alized or otherwise had close relations with the state, to set up voluntary Euro-
pean works councils. In part, this was in pursuit of an international agenda of
support for the European social dimension.
3
2 But the policy also had a domes-
tic aspect in that the government seems to have hoped for external reinforce-
ment of its less than successful legislative efforts to strengthen workplace rep-
resentation in France itself.
For a quantitative assessment of the relative contribution of economic and
national political and institutional factors to the voluntary establishment of Eu-




1. Strength of works councils in a company's home country. Countries in
which works councils have strong rights are Germany, the Netherlands, and
Sweden; countries with weak legal rights for councils are Belgium, France,
Italy, and Luxembourg; and countries without legally mandated councils in-
31. Among the European works councils in the sample, this applies in particular to those at
BSN, Thomson, and Pechiney. At the former two companies, the existence of two European works
councils instead of just one has its origin in complicated maneuvers to minimize CGT influence.
In general, French companies tend to make arrangements for European works councils either with
the CFDT or a European union federation to which the CGT is not affiliated, either way excluding
the CGT from participation.
32. This is most obvious in the public declaration on the agreement at Elf-Aquitaine, which
described the firm's new European works council as the embodiment of the spirit of the proposed
EC directive on workforce information and consultation.
33. Since the companies included in the analysis are the universe of the 100 largest manufactur-
ing companies in Europe and not a random sample of a larger universe, generalization of the results
would strictly speaking be affected by the problem of sample selection bias (for a discussion see
Berk 1983). The pattern of European works councils that we are aware of in service sector firms
or in smaller manufacturing companies does not, however, conflict with the main conclusions of
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elude Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Two dummy
variables were created, CD1 and CD2, which were coded for, respectively,
weak and strong works council rights in home countries. Under a national po-
litical model of voluntary works council formation, the probability of a com-
pany having a European works council should covary with the strength of
works council rights in the company's home country. CD1 and CD2 should
therefore have positive signs, and CD2 should have a larger coefficient than
CD1. Under an economic efficiency model, home-country legislation would
not be expected to make a difference.
2. French Socialist party influence. Qualitative accounts and interviews with
experts and participants offer strong indications that the French government
urged state-owned multinational companies in the second half of the 1980s
to establish European bodies of workforce representation, in anticipation and
support of EC legislation. Companies in the sample were coded according to
their country of origin, with French companies receiving a score of 1 on a
dummy variable, FRANCE.
3. Concentration of production. Multinational companies vary widely with
respect to the diversification of their product range. For the purposes of this
study, companies are considered to have highly concentrated production if
more than 75 percent of their employment is in their main product area, defined
at the two-digit SIC level. This is the case with 52 of the 100 companies in the
sample. Of the remaining 48, 38 have between 50 and 75 percent of employ-
ment in their main product area, and 10 are even more diversified. A variable,
CONC, was created on which the 52 highly concentrated companies received
a score of 1, and the rest a score of 0.
3
4
An economic explanation of voluntary works councils would expect the
probability for a company to have a European works council to increase with
the concentration of its production, given that concentration is likely to in-
crease the degree to which production is centrally coordinated. Concentration
would also appear to increase a company's potential gains from international
rationalization, placing a premium on effective mechanisms for information
and consultation. A highly diversified company, by comparison, which in the
limiting case simply buys up profitable plants without attempting to integrate
them into a synergetic production structure, would derive fewer gains from
rationalization at European level and may not wish to have worker representa-
tives at multinational level inquire into its buying and selling strategies. Under
an economic efficiency explanation, CONC should therefore have a positive
sign. Since a firm's degree of productive concentration is not likely to be af-
fected by its home-country's politics and industrial relations system, the alter-
native model would predict that it has no influence and that CONC will not
be significant.
34. Division of the sample into three instead of two groups makes no difference for the statisti-
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4. Internationalization of employment. All companies in the sample are
multinationals. But some have only marginal international activities while oth-
ers are highly internationalized and significantly exposed to several countries'
laws and practices in setting their industrial relations policies. To determine
the impact of internationalization on voluntary works council formation, com-
panies were grouped in three categories: those with more than two-thirds of
their employment in their home country (low internationalization); those with
between one-third and two-thirds of their workforces in their country of origin
(medium internationalization); and those with less than one-third of employ-
ment there (high internationalization). The dummies INT1 and INT2 were
coded 1 for, respectively, medium and high internationalization.
An economic efficiency model would suggest functional needs for suprana-
tional workforce information, consultation, and representation to increase with
a firm's internationalization. While companies with limited foreign operations
will tend to impose home-country practices on their foreign subsidiaries, com-
panies with a high number of such subsidiaries will have difficulties doing so
and will tend to allow them to follow local practices. As a firm's international-
ization increases even further, it may need to develop a common "identity" and
set of practices that are not reducible to those of any one of the countries in
which it operates. A European works council could play an important role in
facilitating a supranational, company-specific personnel policy. To the extent
that the establishment of European works councils is driven by functional-
economic imperatives, therefore, INT1 and INT2 would be expected to have
positive and high coefficients, with the coefficient for INT2 larger than for
INT1.
A nationally driven political-institutional model, on the other hand, would
make the contribution of internationalization to voluntary European works
councils dependent on favorable institutional conditions in a company's home
country.
3
5 But as the number of countries involved increases with international-
ization, the "reach" of home-country political and institutional resources might
decline and unions may face growing collective action problems, reducing
their ability to coordinate their interests among themselves. Moreover, the
more internationalized a company, the less certainty there is for unions in its
home country that they will be the dominant forces on a possible European
works council; as a result they may be less willing to spend political capital on
bargaining for one. The political model, then, might predict the coefficient for
INT2 to be smaller than for INT I.
3
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35. The same conditional effect might be expected for productive concentration. Ideally, this
possibility would have to be tested using interaction terms. However, in our sample the correlation
between some of the original variables and the interaction terms formed with them is too high to
allow results to be significant.
36. Internationalization and concentration may be correlated with company size. A control vari-
able, LSIZE, defined as the natural logarithm of the size of a company's total workforce in thou-
sands, was therefore included in the analysis. LSIZE is not an essential variable for either of the
two models, although both would probably expect large size to increase the probability of having
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Table 9.5 Expected Results According to the Political and Economic Methods
Variable Political Explanation Economic Explanation
1. Strength of works council CD 1, CD2 > 0; CD2 > CD 1 Not significant
2. France FRANCE > 0 Not significant
3. Concentration Not significant CONC > 1
4. Internationalization INT1, INT2 > 0; INT1 > INT2 INT1, INT2 > 0; INT2 > INT1
Note: Independent variables: CD 1, weak works council rights in home country; CD2, strong works
council rights in home country; FRANCE, company based in France; CONC, more than 75 per-
cent of employment in main product area; INT1, 33 to 66 percent of employment in home country;
INT2, less than 33 percent of employment in home country.
The independent variables and their signs and relationships expected under
the modified political model and under the economic model of voluntary works
council formation are summarized in table 9.5. Since the dependent variable—
absence or presence of a European works council—is categorical in character,
logistic regression is ideally suited to measure the impact of the independent
variables.
The first model tested (model 1 in table 9.6) includes all independent vari-
ables. A striking result is that the coefficient for concentration is not signifi-
cant. The internationalization variables are significant at the .05 and .01 levels,
respectively, and are both positive. The fact that the coefficient for INT2 is
slightly larger than that for INT1 would seem to lend some support to the
economic as opposed to the political model.
Of further note is the large positive coefficient, significant at the .01 level,
of the strong co-determination variable CD2, in line with the expectations of
the political model. Neither the weak co-determination variable CD1 nor the
French multinational variable FRANCE are significant; however, these two
variables have very large estimated coefficients with opposite signs due to the
high correlation between them.
3
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Comparison of the x
2 statistics of models 1 and 2 shows that the concentra-
tion variable CONC may be dropped without loss of explanatory power.
3
8 The
significance, order of magnitude, and signs of the other coefficients remain the
same as in model 1.
Testing the assumption that French Socialist government influence rather
than the presence of weak co-determination rights is behind the growth of Eu-
ropean works councils in French multinationals, model 3 drops CD1 from the
analysis. Comparison of the x
2 statistic of model 3 with that of model 2 shows
that this may be done without significant loss of explanatory power. As a result,
37. This reflects the large number of French-based companies (16) in this category, compared
to companies based in Luxembourg, Belgium, and Italy (5), the other countries with weak works
council rights.
38. The difference of 0.722 is below 2.706, the threshold for acceptance at the .10 level of
significance for one degree of freedom.274 Wolfgang Streeck and Sigurt Vitols
Table 9.6 Logistic Regression Coefficients for Presence of European Works








































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are T-ratios.
*Significant at .10 level.
**Significant at .05 level.
***Significant at .01 level.
both CD2 and FRANCE have significant and positive signs, as predicted by
the national political model; the coefficients of the internationalization vari-
ables INT1 and INT2 remain significant and positive.
3
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Overall, the results offer evidence for the overriding importance of national
political and institutional factors in the formation of European works councils.
Concentration of company production, a key variable for any economic model,
was found not to contribute to the rise of European works councils. While
internationalization does make a contribution to voluntary council formation,
and apparently in a linear fashion as predicted under an economic efficiency
model, this effect may in reality be conditional on home-country institutions
and may thus be fully compatible with the political model.
Nota bene that the impact of national political and institutional conditions
39. Testing the three models with a reduced sample containing only the 45 companies that
returned usable answers to the mail survey yields substantially the same results. A possible alterna-
tive to model 3, which involves dropping FRANCE instead of CD1, would technically also be
acceptable relative to model 2; however, its relative fit was not as good as that of model 3. This is
in line with the qualitative evidence that it is state pressure, and not weak domestic works council
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would be even stronger were it not for the "Dutch anomaly," that is, the ab-
sence of European works councils at all four major Dutch manufacturing com-
panies despite the existence of strong national works council legislation. In
part, this may be accounted for by the experience at Philips, described above,
and by the fact that two of the four firms, Royal Dutch-Shell and Unilever, are
in part British. But there is also the possibility that in a small country such as
the Netherlands whose large multinational companies inevitably have a very
high share of employment abroad, unions are more ambivalent than elsewhere
about sharing representation with what would almost inevitably be a majority
of foreign representatives.
9.8 Summary and Conclusion
The growth of voluntary European works councils is best accounted for, not
by common European factors such as economic integration or the politics of
the social dimension, but by national conditions in companies' home countries,
especially with respect to the political, institutional, and legal resources of
labor. Governed by a logic of national diversity, voluntary European works
councils, while on the surface "European," are products of national union strat-
egies, industrial relations practices, legal systems, and government policies.
The fundamental fact about them that any theory must accommodate is their
highly skewed national distribution, which rules out political or economic ex-




The voluntary adoption of European works councils by large multinational
firms is unlikely to signal or precipitate statutory enactment of workforce in-
formation, consultation, and co-determination rights in EC law. Nor will volun-
tary councils contribute to the development of an integrated European indus-
trial relations system with interrelated and coordinated arenas of joint
regulation at the supranational, sectoral, and enterprise levels. The analysis in
this paper suggests that the functional weakness and structural unevenness of
present European works councils are there to stay. Voluntary European works
councils are not works councils in a technical sense, but de facto international
union committees for large companies, set up by managements and unions as
a low-cost response to some of the consequences of the internationalization of
the European economy. Far from providing or preparing supranational gover-
40. While not collected systematically, available information on developments since 1991 sup-
ports the conclusions offered in this paper. European works councils are reportedly being estab-
lished at Volvo and at Thyssen AG, i.e., a Swedish-based and a German-based company. Informa-
tion on companies outside the sample is also consistent with the analysis, in that European works
councils exist or are being set up in German-based (Allianz, Tengelmann, Schmalbach-Lubecka,
and Grundig) and French-based (AGF) firms. Functionally, all these councils are limited to the
exchange of information. For a textbook case study of national political resources accounting for
supranational workforce participation arrangements in multinational firms, see the case of Euro-
pipe (EIRR, no. 213 [October 1981]: 12ff).276 Wolfgang Streeck and Sigurt Vitols
nance of employment relations at the European level, European works councils
seem to do no more than create interfaces within large companies between
national industrial relations systems, which as such remain separate and ex-
posed to the potentially destabilizing effects of regime competition in a border-
crossing integrated market.
A theory that accounts for voluntary European works councils by national
political and institutional differences can account not just for their skewed dis-
tribution and nationally imprinted structures but also for the tensions and con-
flicts between national unions over and within them. For example, in Britain
works councils are usually regarded as instruments of "joint consultation"
(Marginson 1992), which is in sharp contrast to the German view of councils
as organs of co-determination. Since joint consultation is considered paternal-
istic by many British unionists, the prospect of European works councils not
becoming "real" works councils does not appear threatening to them; British
unions see their promise rather in being potential agents of enterprise-based
collective bargaining (Hall 1992; Sisson, Waddington, and Whitston 1992).
European works council legislation, if ever to come forward, would be ex-
pected by them to do no more, but also no less, than provide a form of statutory
support for union recognition.
4
1 German unions, on the other hand, conduct
collective bargaining not at the company but at the industrial level. For them it
is vitally important that company-level industrial relations remain defined as
something other than collective bargaining, above all in large firms whose
presence in industrywide bargaining units is essential for the mobilization of
strong bargaining power (Streeck 1991). That is, were European works coun-
cils to become collective bargaining agents, German unions would feel threat-
ened; but were they to become co-determination bodies, British unions would
find themselves dragged into "joint consultation." As a result, European works
councils will likely be neither.
Another implication of voluntarism, and of European works councils com-
ing about as an outgrowth of national conditions in a company's home country,
is that supranational representation of workers and unions in foreign subsidiar-
ies depends on the interests and power resources of home-base industrial rela-
tions actors. Without legislation, subsidiary unions are deprived of voice if
home-country unions prefer not to push for supranational representation, or
design it so that their privileged influence is preserved. Due to differences be-
tween countries in economic internationalization, industrial organization, and
industrial relations, divisions of interest and strategy between home-country
and subsidiary unions may come to be reflected in divisions between national
union movements. For example, Italian unions are home-country unions for
only a small number of large European multinationals (see above, table 9.2);
for the vast majority of European multinational companies operating in Italy,
41. The hope apparently is that European legal provisions would then somehow radiate into the
British domestic system, restoring conditions that existed there before Thatcher.277 Europe: Between Mandatory Consultation and Voluntary Information
they organize subsidiary workforces. Under a voluntarist representation re-
gime, what voice they may have depends largely on the goodwill and bar-
gaining power of unions and works councillors in other countries. But while
this should dispose them favorably toward European-level legislation, their
own, Italian system of workplace representation is not legally based, and na-
tional resistance to legal regulation is strong.
British unions, on the other hand, organize the home base of many European
multinationals, potentially enabling them to tailor international representative
arrangements to their interests. But British multinationals are often highly in-
ternationalized. Even if British unions had the power to make them agree to
European works councils, significant influence would therefore be exercised
on the councils by unionists from other countries. British unions also have no
experience with council-type workplace representation and often lack a
workplace-based structure to which a multinational works council could be
linked.
4
2 By comparison, foreign council members, especially from German or
French subsidiaries, are likely to be well resourced and skilled. To the extent
that this would make British unions reluctant to press for European works
councils, the consequence would be disenfranchisement of workforces in the
European subsidiaries of British firms.
Generally, the slow and uneven growth of works councils in European multi-
national companies demonstrates the dependence of council-style workplace
representation on union and legal support. Works councils come into existence
if demanded by strong unions or made mandatory by an interventionist govern-
ment. In an international setting like the European Community, where unions
are weak and legislation is absent and unlikely to come about, councils grow,
if at all, out of constituent national systems, to the extent that national unions
and legal regulations manage to extend their reach into the international arena.
Even so, as long as they are not directly supported by supranational law, the
councils that result remain functionally weak.
Employers' rhetorical recognition of the importance of collective communi-
cation with workforces notwithstanding, voluntarily instituted works councils
remain limited to the exchange of information and are refused formal consulta-
tion rights, let alone rights to co-determination. Resistance to legally binding
mandates for supranational workplace representation is offered even by em-
ployers that in other settings declare themselves comfortable with mandated
works councils entitled to consultation and co-determination. Employer prefer-
ences for voluntarism seem resistant to experience, and certainly to theoretical
reasoning on the economic efficiency advantages of mandated institutions.
Very likely, this is because voluntarism leaves employers an exit option should
matters become tough, and because, unlike unions and worker representatives,
42. In nonunionized companies, the present draft directive would require international represen-
tatives to be directly elected by the entire workforce—something that may appear to British unions
as setting a dangerous precedent for dual-channel representation or even union substitution.278 Wolfgang Streeck and Sigurt Vitols
exit from participation regimes increases rather than reduces their control over
decisions. Moreover, voluntarism in supranational settings seems to be a politi-
cal resource even and especially for employers who in their national systems
operate under legal regulation: to the extent that they have the possibility of
moving subjects out of mandated national into voluntary supranational partici-
pation, the balance of power in national industrial relations is shifted in their
favor.
Voluntary participation at the supranational level is acceptable to business
as long as it remains an alternative to, instead of an intermediary step toward,
a replication of national social democracy. Potentially even contributing to a
softening of national regimes, supranational voluntarism leaves multinational
firms the freedom to do what they want while sparing them the hazards of an
anomic absence of all institutions. Under voluntarism, when everything is said
and done, it is those in stronger market or hierarchical positions who decide
how much symmetry and equity between themselves and others is symmetrical
and equitable, and how much participation is reasonable and efficient. This
advantage is not easily given up.
Appendix A
Sample and Sources of Information
The sample for this study consists of 100 of the largest European multinational
corporations in manufacturing. The goal was to cover the 100 manufacturing
firms with the largest number of employees in Europe, including companies
based outside of the European Community and Europe. However, since stan-
dard lists, as provided by the Financial Times or Fortune, do not break down
employment by country or region, they offer only approximations. A list of the
25 largest European manufacturing employers, compiled by Labour Research,
was supplemented by a selection of European-based corporations included in
the 1989 Fortune 500 international list. In this list, rank is based on annual
sales, and manufacturing companies are defined as companies deriving at least
50 percent of their sales from manufacturing or mining. Companies based in
mining as well as companies known to be limited to only one country (such as
the large state holdings in Italy and Spain) were excluded from the sample.
From the various national and international business directories, which vary
widely in the quantity and quality of the information they provide, a list was
compiled of the names and addresses of the directors of the companies' inter-
national industrial relations, employee relations, or human relations depart-
ments. When this information could not be found, the names and addresses of
the chief executive officers were used. Where these were not available either,
the generic identification, "personnel director," at the company's European279 Europe: Between Mandatory Consultation and Voluntary Information
headquarters was used. A four-page questionnaire was mailed to the 100 ad-
dresses, with a request that it be returned within six weeks. A follow-up letter
was sent to those that had not responded within that period. Forty-five valid
responses were received; an additional 17 companies sent replies declining
to participate.
The questionnaire itself, in addition to asking for information on the person
who filled it out, requested basic data about any existing arrangement for infor-
mation, consultation, or negotiation with employee representatives on a multi-
national basis. If such an arrangement existed, respondents were asked which
countries were covered, how many workforce representatives there were and
how they were selected, which unions (if any) were involved, how often meet-
ings were held, what subjects were discussed at the meetings, whether meet-
ings were just informational or also involved consultation or negotiation,
whether any written agreements had been reached, how many of the company's
employees in the European Community were covered, and whether separate
provisions had been made for different categories of workers (e.g., white-collar
and blue-collar workers). Companies that did not currently have a works-
council-like arrangement were asked an open-ended question about whether
establishing one was being contemplated or planned for the future, and
whether one had been tried in the past and discontinued.
Other sources of information were used to supplement the survey responses.
These included publications like the European Industrial Relations Review,
Industrial Relations Europe, and the Financial Times, as well as publications
from the European Trade Union Institute and two recent studies of multina-
tional information and consultation arrangements in European multinationals
(Gold and Hall 1992; Myrvang 1991). In addition, interviews were conducted
with union and business representatives and EC officials.
Appendix B
Companies Included in the Sample
ABB Asea Brown Boveri* Bertelsmann Ciba-Geigy
Aerospatiale BICC Cockerill Sambre
Akzo BOC Group Continental*
Alcatel Alsthom Bosch, Robert Courtaulds
Allied-Lyons British Aerospace Daimler-Benz*
Alusuisse British Steel Corp. Dalgety
Arbed British Petroleum Co. Dow International
Associated British Foods BSN* Electrolux*
BASF* BTR ElfAquitaine*
BAT Industries Bull Group* Exxon
Bayer* Cadbury Schweppes Feldmuehle Nobel
Bayerische Motoren Werke Caterpillar Overseas Fiat
(continued)280 Wolfgang Streeck and Sigurt Vitols
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